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REJOINDER (RESPONSE TO ARTICLE BY CHRISTOPHER MAYLEA AND 
CHRISTOPHER RYAN) 
 
MATTHEW CARROLL* 
 
In ‘Decision-Making Capacity and the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal’ 1  Drs  
Christopher Maylea and Christopher Ryan argue that the Victorian Mental Health 
Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) has an obligation to consider the assessment of a compulsory 
patient’s decision-making capacity when determining whether or not to make a 
compulsory Treatment Order. Based on their interpretation of relevant legislation (the 
Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic)) and a review of the Tribunal’s published statements of 
reasons (that is, reasons for decision), the authors contend that the Tribunal makes an 
error by not meeting this positive obligation to take this matter into consideration.  
 
This criticism is based on a fundamental misinterpretation of relevant law and a 
misunderstanding of the processes of the Tribunal. The authors failed to sufficiently 
recognise the distinctive features of the legislation that establishes the Tribunal and its 
processes.  Their article also generates a misconception that by not focusing on their 
decision-making capacity, the perspectives of mental health consumers are not being 
considered as part of Tribunal hearings in Victoria.  
 
The Tribunal welcomes scrutiny of its decisions and encourages investigation of its 
procedures and decision-making by actively co-operating with researchers and 
publishing de-identified statements of reasons. 2  However, the published article 
misinterprets the relevant law and misrepresents decision-making by the Tribunal and 
must therefore be corrected.  
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 2014 (VIC) (Austl) 
 
As the authors acknowledge, some Australian jurisdictions have chosen to make 
decision-making capacity a central focus of the legislative criteria governing when a 
person can or cannot be compelled to receive treatment for a mental illness.  After a 
lengthy, consultative review of the former Mental Health Act 1986 (‘the former Mental 
Health Act’), Victoria chose not to do this. The Tribunal is very aware that this approach 
remains contested, and some stakeholders would have preferred an approach similar 
to that adopted elsewhere. For example, the West Australian Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA) expressly makes decision-making capacity a central consideration in determining 
   * Matthew Carroll is President of the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal. 
1 Christopher Maylea and Christopher James Ryan, ‘Decision-Making Capacity and the Victorian Mental 
Health Tribunal’ [2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 87. 
2 Statements of reasons are prepared at the request of a party. In 2016-17, such requests were made in 
only 2.9 percent of conducted hearings. Statements of reasons are published on the AustLII website in 
accordance with the Tribunal’s publication policy  
   (http://www.mht.vic.gov.au/statements-of-reasons/) – Published statements of reasons account for an 
even smaller proportion of hearings. In 2016-17, 43.55 percent of statements of reasons were published, 
a figure that equates to 1.25 percent of the total hearings conducted by the Tribunal during that time 
period. 
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whether involuntary treatment orders can be made.3 However, like any other court or 
tribunal, the role of the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal is to interpret and apply the 
law as it is written, and not to reconfigure a clear legislative framework to introduce 
tests or provisions that were not included when the Victorian Parliament passed the 
Act. 
 
The Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) (‘the Act’) is the legislation under which the Tribunal 
operates. Section 5 of the Act sets down four criteria that must be satisfied before a 
person can be the subject of a compulsory Treatment Order. In brief, these criteria 
specify that: 
(a) the person must have mental illness (section 5(a)); 
(b) because of that mental illness the person must require immediate treatment to prevent 
serious deterioration in their mental or physical health or serious harm to themselves or 
another person (section 5(b)); 
(c) immediate treatment will be provided if an Order is made (section 5(c)); 
(d) and there is no less restrictive means reasonably available to enable the person to receive 
the immediate treatment (section 5(d)). 
None of these criteria include an assessment of a person’s decision making capacity. 
 
Nevertheless, the authors argue that the Tribunal must read into section 5 (and, in 
particular section 5(d), the ‘least restrictive’ criterion) a requirement to consider a 
person’s decision-making capacity when deciding whether or not to make a compulsory 
Treatment Order. While their preferred approach to the conditions under which persons 
may receive compulsory mental health treatment is understandable, it is simply 
inconsistent with the language and structure of the Act as well as with the legal 
principles governing the interpretation of legislation.  
 
Key principles of statutory interpretation in the context of the Act were recently 
addressed by the Supreme Court of Victoria.  In Daniels v Eastern Health  (Daniels’ 
case) the Court identified four conditions that must be satisfied in order to read (or 
import) words into a statutory provision namely4: 
(a) the court must know the mischief with which the Act was dealing; 
(b) the court must be satisfied that by inadvertence Parliament has overlooked an eventuality 
which must be dealt with if the purpose of the Act is to be achieved; 
(c) the court must be able to state with certainty what words Parliament would have used 
to overcome the omission if its attention had been drawn to the defect; and 
(d) the modified construction (with the additional words) must be reasonably open and not 
be unnatural, incongruous or unreasonable and must be consistent with the statutory 
scheme. 
Notably, the second and third conditions identified in Daniels’ case make it 
inappropriate to adopt Maylea and Ryan’s approach of importing a requirement of 
‘carefully considering’ a person’s decision-making capacity when determining whether 
 3 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) ss 25(1)(c), 25(2)(c). 
  4 Daniels v Eastern Health [2016] VSC 148 [11] (per McDonald J) quoting Bermingham v Corrective 
Services Commission of New South Wales (1988) 15 NSWLR 292, 299 (per McHugh JA) quoting 
Wentworth Securities v Jones [1980] AC 74, [105-6] (per Lord Diplock).  
5
or not to make a compulsory Treatment Order.  
 
Regarding the second condition, as previously noted, the Victorian Parliament did not 
include decision-making capacity as one of the criteria governing compulsory Treatment 
Orders, but this was not an inadvertent omission; instead, it expressly opted for a 
different formulation of the criteria for compulsory treatment. The deliberate nature of 
the omission of decision-making capacity as a criterion governing the making of 
compulsory Treatment Orders is demonstrated or reinforced by the fact that elsewhere 
the legislation includes provisions that do incorporate the consideration of decision-
making capacity and/or the provision of informed consent: 
 
Firstly  
 
Decision-making capacity and the provision (or withholding) of informed consent must 
be considered in the context of the actual provision of treatment. 5  Despite the 
contention of the authors these provisions do not bear upon the making of Treatment 
Orders by the Tribunal. 
 
Secondly  
 
When determining applications for an electroconvulsive treatment (‘ECT’) Order for an 
adult compulsory patient,6 the first question the Tribunal must consider is whether or 
not the person has capacity to give (or by implication withhold) informed consent for 
ECT.7 If the Tribunal decides a person has capacity it must refuse the application.8 
 
Thirdly  
 
In relation to the authorisation of neurosurgery for mental illness, the Tribunal cannot 
grant an application unless it is satisfied that the person who is to be treated has given 
informed consent in writing to the procedure.9 
 
Fourthly  
 
The Tribunal must consider decision-making capacity or the withholding of informed 
consent when determining applications concerning interstate transfer of treatment 
orders or interstate transfer orders.10 
 
5 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) ss 70, 71. 
  6 Decision-making capacity is also relevant to ECT applications beyond those concerning adult compulsory 
patients but this is the single largest group and the relevant point can be sufficiently illustrated by 
focusing on this cohort. 
7 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 96. 
  8 In 2016/17 the Tribunal refused 100 (14.5%) ECT applications, of those 41% were refused on the basis 
that the person had capacity to provide informed consent. 
9 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 102. 
10 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) ss 321, 323. 
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It is also relevant to note that the criteria for involuntary Treatment Orders enshrined 
in the former Mental Health Act did require consideration of a person’s ability to consent 
to necessary treatment.11 The particular approach in the former Mental Health Act was 
strongly criticised and was unlikely to have been replicated in the treatment criteria of 
a new Act. What is relevant for present purposes is that Parliament not only abandoned 
that approach, it also did not replace it with a differently formulated criterion regarding 
decision-making capacity. This, alongside Parliament’s inclusion of specific provisions 
relating to decision-making capacity and/or informed consent elsewhere in the Act, 
demonstrates the absence of such an inclusion in the criteria governing compulsory 
Treatment Orders simply cannot be regarded as something that was inadvertently 
overlooked. 
 
Additionally, the third condition identified in Daniels’  case presents a further hurdle to 
the authors’ suggestion that decision-making capacity be incorporated into the 
Tribunal’s decision-making regarding compulsory Treatment Orders. As explained 
above, the Act is not silent in relation to decision-making capacity and informed consent 
– these concepts are incorporated in various parts of the Act. But where they are the 
Act employs very different formulations or approaches.12  Consequently, it would be 
impossible to conclude with the requisite degree of certainty what words or approach 
Parliament would have employed if it were to include decision-making capacity within 
the criteria governing the making of compulsory Treatment Orders. 
 
Thus, principles of statutory interpretation, including the implications of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic),13 do not support reading in decision-
making capacity to section 5 of the Act as contended by the authors. 
 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that the majority of Statements of Reasons published 
by the Tribunal which were examined by the authors did not refer to the ‘decision-
making capacity’ of the person. In summary, this is not a relevant criterion listed in the 
Act nor is it legitimately imported by principles of statutory interpretation.  
 
CONSIDERING THE VIEWS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS 
 
It is important to note that although the Act does not include decision-making capacity 
of the person as a requisite consideration for the making of compulsory Treatment 
Orders, the Act does not disregard the views and preferences of the person. Indeed, 
11 Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) s 8(d). 
  12 For example, in some cases the Tribunal’s task is to determine whether the person has given informed 
consent rather than whether they have capacity to give informed consent (noting that capacity to give 
informed consent is merely one of the requirements of informed consent (see ––  s 69(1)(a))). Examples 
of such sections include: s 102(2)(a) pertaining to the Tribunal’s powers in respect of an application for 
neurosurgery for mental illness and s 96(2)(a)(i) relating to ECT applications involving young persons 
who have capacity to give informed consent. In other cases, the test the Tribunal must apply is drafted 
in terms of ‘the person does not have capacity to give informed consent or does not consent…’ Examples 
of such provisions are ss 321(4)(ii) and 323(4)(a)(ii) involving applications for interstate transfer for 
community patients and inpatients respectively. 
13 See ––Daniel’s case, paras (7) and (8).  
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the Act requires the Tribunal, in its decision making, to consider the views and 
preferences of the person receiving treatment and those who support them.14 To meet 
this obligation the Tribunal is committed to conducting solution-focused  hearings. The 
Tribunal’s Guide to Solution-Focused Hearings in the Mental Health Tribunal 15 is based 
on the work of Dr Michael King, a former West Australian and now Victorian Magistrate 
who has been instrumental in articulating a framework of practice for the specialist 
‘problem-solving’ lists in Magistrates’ Courts.16 
 
A solution-focused approach recognises that a unique series of experiences and events 
precedes a person being a compulsory patient at a particular point in time, and if they 
are willing or wish to explain some of that, it is relevant and important for them to have 
the opportunity to do so. A solution-focused approach also challenges everyone to 
remember that compulsory treatment should never be regarded as an ongoing norm 
for any individual. Where possible there should be exploration of a pathway to less 
restriction and greater autonomy for individuals – including what voluntariness truly 
means in the context of each person’s circumstances, taking into account that people 
should be allowed to make decisions that involve a degree of risk.17 
 
An important clarification regarding solution-focused hearings is that the Tribunal is not 
to be regarded as the source of solutions. Rather a solution-focused approach facilitates 
a process that can provide an opportunity for those involved in hearings (mental health 
consumers, their support people and clinicians) to explore issues and potential 
strategies to address difficulties. In some cases it may simply be about timing – seizing 
an opportunity to discuss issues that hasn’t presented itself before. 
 
Two case studies illustrate this approach and how the views and preferences of mental 
health consumers are taken into account. 
 
Rebecca* was distressed by the side-effects of her antipsychotic medication, in 
particular its impact on her artistic work; she was also concerned about the lack of a 
referral to a psychologist as part of her treatment plan, and that her clinical history 
contained incorrect information. Rebecca’s treating team had asked the Tribunal to 
make a 12-month Community Treatment Order. Based on the discussion at the hearing 
where Rebecca and her treating team agreed on a strategy to address her concerns, 
14 For instance, among other factors, s 55(2) requires the Tribunal, to the extent that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, to have regard to (a) the person’s views and preferences about treatment of his or her 
mental illness and the reasons for those views and preferences, including any recovery outcomes that 
the person would like to achieve; and (e) the views of the person’s carer, if the Tribunal is satisfied that 
making the Order will directly affect the carer and the care relationship. Similar provisions requiring the 
Tribunal to have regard to the views of patients and carers are contained in ss 65(4), 93(2), 94(3), 
281(4), 291(2), 321(3) and 323(3). (Many of these refer to obligations of the authorised psychiatrist 
but provisions specifying the Tribunal’s powers make it clear that the Tribunal must also consider these 
factors) 
15 The Guide to Solution-Focused Hearings in the Mental Health Tribunal is available on the Tribunal’s 
website: www.mht.vic.gov.au/forms-and-publication/guidance-materials/   
16 Dr King’s Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book is available here:  
   aija.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Solution-Focused-Judging-Bench-Book.pdf. 
17 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 11(1)(d). 
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the Tribunal made a much shorter 12-week Order, as Rebecca should be able to be 
treated voluntarily if these issues were resolved. 
 
Jacob’s* treating team asked the Tribunal to make an Order that would require him 
to remain in hospital for at least another three weeks. Jacob was desperate to leave 
hospital for a number of reasons, including upcoming events that were of deep cultural 
significance to him and his family. The Tribunal hearing was the first occasion Jacob’s 
mother and father had been available to participate in a meeting with Jacob and his 
treating team. The discussion that took place identified a collaborative strategy 
between Jacob, his family and treating team that meant the Tribunal made an Order 
that would allow Jacob to be treated while living at home (and participating in the 
cultural events) rather than staying in hospital. 
 
The Victorian Mental Health Tribunal is able to work in such a way because it has been 
resourced at a level that allows it to conduct hearings where there is a reasonable 
amount of time to discuss the perspective of all participants. The Tribunal allocates at 
least one hour to each of its hearings whereas in many other jurisdictions, mental health 
tribunals will conduct up to three hearings in the same amount of time. 
 
In addition, since the establishment of the Tribunal in 2014 it has worked closely with 
mental health consumers and carers on the design and development of its processes 
and procedures. Consumer and carer advisors have an influential role. A particularly 
significant initiative led by our consumer and carer Tribunal Advisory Group that will be 
rolled out in the second half of 2018 is a mechanism by which consumers and carers 
can provide feedback about the extent to which they did or did not feel listened to in 
the course of a Tribunal hearing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is entirely appropriate that ongoing policy-level discussion and debate occur 
concerning whether or not capacity should be the core issue that determines whether 
compulsory Treatment Orders can be made. Mental health law is neither fixed nor 
unchangeable but must evolve in response to changing expectations and our 
understanding of many factors, including international human rights law. 
 
However, it is inappropriate to misinterpret the existing statutory framework in which 
a tribunal operates and to criticise a tribunal for failing to adopt a policy preference 
which cannot legitimately be imported into its governing legislation.  Mental health law 
has a profound impact on people’s lives. It is essential, therefore, that when research 
is published which addresses tribunal processes and decision-making that it is accurate 
and comprehensive. 
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